Reader Questions

One of my readers asked the following questions.

1. When you talk about the Carthaginian phalanx, what exactly do you mean? Do you believe they operated in a similar fashion to the Macedonian phalanx, or are you using the term to mean a mass of heavy infantry that fought hand-to-hand with spear and shield?

2. Also, the consul Publius Laverius Laevinius is thought to have had four legions with accompanying allies at Heraclea in 280BC, so was there a specific law limiting a consul's command to two legions, or are you talking about the customary allocation? Of course, at Cannae there were 8 legions plus allies, so they could clearly change things when they needed to!

A. I have found no evidence that the Carthaginian “phalanx” resembled the Greek version. By Carthaginian phalanx I refer to a massed infantry formation equipped with swords versus spears. This is specifically pointed out by Livy and others writing about the Battle of Cannae. The Punic center used Roman weapons captured at Trasimene which would not have included phalanx type spears. Livy goes on to say, “The Gallic and Spanish contingents carried shields of similar shape, but their swords were of a different pattern, those of the Gauls being very long and not pointed, those of the Spaniards, who were accustomed to using them for piercing rather than cutting, being handily short and sharply pointed.”

At Zama, Hannibal did not use a tightly packed infantry, deploying three massive lines instead. Again I quote Livy. “Hannibal put his elephants (80 of them) right in the van of his army; behind them were the Ligurian and Gallic auxiliaries with a certain proportion of troops from Mauretania and the Balearics. In the second line he stationed his Carthaginian and African troops together with the one legion from Macedonia; Then a moderate distance to the rear of these, came a reserve of Italians and Bruttians.

A. Regarding the two legion army per consul. The time of Heraclea predated this requirement. I quote from The Punic Wars by Brian Caven (essential reading for Roman military lovers),

"Imperium – power, and essentially the power to command the people under arms – was  the real basis of the Roman state. However it had come into conflict with the developing rights and liberties of the Roman people, and had accordingly been divided among two senior and four junior magistrates; and certain restrictions had been placed on their use of it, by custom and statute. Imperium, especially consular Imperium, was also the object of the legitimate ambition of the ruling class, which was unwilling to share it among a larger group of magistrates, and also unwilling to allow the same individual to hold it more than once or twice in a lifetime with the result that someone else, who as a member of the aristocracy had a prescriptive right to it, was excluded. Furthermore, in order to prevent the working of the constitution from being hamstrung, the consuls had to be prevented from neutralizing each other’s effectiveness and also from poaching on the reserves of their juniors, the praetors.”

The end result was two consular armies of two legions each and four praetorian armies of one legion each.

Fighting Hannibal – The Man and not the Phalanx

My last post used the words of Polybius to answer a question regarding the effectiveness of the Roman manipular technique against the phalanx formation. In this post we will delve deeper into the subject, specifically the Roman battles against Hannibal and his phalanx, to show that victory had more to do with leadership and skill than the phalanx as a superior military tactic. Hannibal was superior in every way to the Roman generals of the Republican period because he was an expert tactician and charismatic leader. Having said that, we have to give the Roman generals some slack because they were hamstrung by politics and the command philosophy of the Republican political system.

In the first years of the Second Punic War, the Romans fought Hannibal on three occasions: Trebbia in November 218, Lake Trasimene in June 217, and Cannae in August  216. All were disasters for Rome. In each case Hannibal used topography, the element of surprise, and speed to defeat his enemy. The Romans were unprepared to fight a superior tactician and in at least the first two cases vastly underestimated their adversary.

At Trebbia, Hannibal set up the battle so the Romans missed their breakfast and had to wade through ice cold water to get to him, exhausting themselves before they could engage. After Hannibal’s Numidian cavalry chased off the Roman horsemen, the maniples became vulnerable to attacks from the side as they moved forward. Then, with elephants trampling the wings of the Roman front, an ambush from behind was launched. Eventually the Romans were able to puncture the center of the Punic line, but the battle was lost everywhere else by that time. Roman casualties amounted to some 15,000.

The phalanx at the Punic center had been manned by expendable Gauls who were not the tactical focal point of the battle but instead were used as a drawing card for the Roman legions.

It’s hard to believe that Hannibal had only arrived in Italy a couple of weeks earlier after his tortuous journey over the Alps where he lost as many as 20,000 men. To plan and engage in a major battle in that short time is a testimony to his leadership.

Before moving on to Lake Trasimene, we need to discuss the politics and structure of the Roman Army as it impacted military operations during this period. At the time of the second Punic War no consul was allowed to have more than two legions under his command, severely limiting the size of his army. Moreover, on those occasions where the consuls represented rival factions in the Senate, they refused to cooperate in a combined command structure and, instead, operated separately. The only option to overcoming this limitation was to invoke a dictatorship, but the Senate had not yet lost confidence in its commanders in the period after Trebbia.

Flaminius and Germinus were elected consuls for 217 B.C. and each took command of his army in the spring. Flaminius was positioned to pursue Hannibal if he chose the center route through Italy while Germinus’ army was located to the west. Once Flaminius became aware of Hannibal’s moves in his direction he made the unwise decision to go after him without waiting for Germinus to reinforce him. Aware of Flaminius by reconnaissance, Hannibal’s movements took him near Lake Trasimene which he immediately recognized as the perfect location for an ambush.

Hannibal distributed his troops along a defile that framed the eastern shore of the lake and deployed cavalry and skirmishers on the road to the north. Flaminius, following Hannibal, marched around the north side of the lake with no sense of what lie ahead of him. In the morning mist the Romans encountered the vanguard of the Punic army thinking it was their rear. As they pushed on, they came under fire by the Punic troops stationed above them on the hillside. Then as they continued to press southward into the defile, the Romans were annihilated.

The photograph below shows defile on the right of the modern road with the lake on the left.

Roman loses were 15,000 killed, including Flaminius, and 10,000 captured.

The loses at Trebbia and Lake Trasimene demanded the appointment of a dictator and Q. Fabius Maximus Verrucosus was named. Little was accomplished during his tenure which amounted to the remainder of 217 B.C. Fabius dogged Hannibal but would not fight him. This frustrated Hannibal because the Punic leader believed that Rome could only be taken if its allies could be turned and the allies could only be turned if they saw the Roman army defeated. At the end of 217 B.C, the dictatorship was suspended.

The year 216 B.C. brought new consuls into the command position: C. Terentius Varro and L. Aemilius Paullus. They readied their armies in the spring and picked up Hannibal’s trail that summer, arriving at Cannae on the last day of July. Both commanders knew how important it was to operate with  a combined force as they agreed to alternate command on a daily basis. On the day of the battle Varro served as the overall commander. His plan was to apply the lessons of Trebbia by eliminating the wings that were decimated in that battle so he collapsed his maniples into a phalanx of overwhelming strength designed to destroy the center of the Punic line. The absence of wings meant that the infantry contingent had to be protected by cavalry or it would be vulnerable on all sides.

This was to be one of the classic battles of all time, studied by military strategists ever since. Hannibal had his strongest troops on the wings with the weakest in the center drawn up in a narrow crescent. Those wings were protected by a superior cavalry which routed the Roman horsemen and left the Roman sides vulnerable. The Roman infantry punched through the center but was then attacked by the Punic wings who had performed a ninety degree turn toward the flanks of the Romans and formed a phalanx on each side. They pressed forward and compressed the Roman army into a box. New assaults from the rear completed the box and made the rout complete. Fifteen thousand were killed or taken prisoner and Paullus was slain.

The Romans at Cannae had used a collapsed manipular formation against a Punic phalanx designed to give way. Once the Romans had pushed to their deepest penetration, the wing phalanxes of the Carthaginian army turned inward and destroyed them. At Cannae, Hannibal’s master plan came to fruition. The pincer movement that failed at Trebbia worked brilliantly here. He used speed against the strength of the Roman center by offering only minimal resistance to it and then maneuvering around it until the trap was sprung.

In each of these battles we see the phalanx as a component of the Carthaginian formation but not the key. There was never a pure phalanx/maniple face-off that would prove the military superiority of one versus the other because there were other more important factors that determined the outcome.

Roman Battle Tactics Versus the Phalanx

One of my readers posed the following question. “How were the Romans able to get past the long spears of a Greek phalanx, when they were only armed with a gladius? Flanking maneuvers?”

For the answer, let us turn to Polybius, the Greek historian, who spent much of his life in Rome. His dates were ~ 200-118 B.C, so his observations and writings describe conditions during the third Punic War.

In his sixth book of Histories, Polybius endeavored to explain why the Romans were able to defeat the phalanx. I quote him directly.

“Why is it then that the Romans conquer? And what is it that brings disaster on those who employ the phalanx? Why, just because war is full of uncertainties both as to time and place; whereas there is but one time and one kind of ground in which a phalanx can fully work. If, then, there were anything to compel the enemy to accommodate himself to the time and place of the phalanx, when about to fight a general engagement, it would be but natural to expect that those who employed the phalanx would always carry off the victory.

But if the enemy finds it possible, and even easy, to avoid its attack, what becomes of its formidable character? Again, no one denies that for its employment it is indispensable to have a country flat, bare, and without such impediments as ditches, cavities, depressions, steep banks, or beds of rivers: for all such obstacles are sufficient to hinder and dislocate this particular formation.

And that it is, I may say, impossible, or at any rate exceedingly rare to find a piece of country of twenty strades, or sometimes of even greater extent, without any such obstacles, everyone will also admit.

However, let us suppose that such a district has been found. If the enemy decline to come down into it, but traverse the country sacking the towns and territories of the allies, what use will the phalanx be? For if it remains on the ground suited to itself, it will not only fail to benefit its friends, but will be incapable even of preserving itself; for the carriage of provisions will be easily stopped by the enemy, seeing that they are in undisputed possession of the country: while if it quits its proper ground, from the wish to strike a blow, it will be an easy prey to the enemy. Nay, if a general does descend into the plain, and yet does not risk his whole army upon one charge of the phalanx or upon one chance, but maneuvers for a time to avoid coming to close quarters in the engagement, it is easy to learn what will be the result from what the Romans are now actually doing.

The Romans do not, then, attempt to extend their front to equal that of a phalanx, and then charge directly upon it with their whole force: but some of their divisions are kept in reserve, while others join battle with the enemy at close quarters. Now, whether the phalanx in its charge drives its opponents from their ground, or is itself driven back, in either case its peculiar order is dislocated; for whether in following the retiring, or flying from the advancing enemy, they quit the rest of their forces: and when this takes place, the enemy's reserves can occupy the space thus left, and the ground which the phalanx had just before been holding, and so no longer charge them face to face, but fall upon them on their flank and rear.

If, then, it is easy to take precautions against the opportunities and peculiar advantages of the phalanx, but impossible to do so in the case of its disadvantages, must it not follow that in practice the difference between these two systems is enormous? Of course, those generals who employ the phalanx must march over ground of every description, must pitch camps, occupy points of advantage, besiege, and be besieged, and meet with unexpected appearances of the enemy: for all these are part and parcel of war, and have an important and sometimes decisive influence on the ultimate victory. And in all these cases the Macedonian phalanx is difficult, and sometimes impossible, to handle, because the men cannot act either in squads or separately.

The Roman order on the other hand is flexible: for every Roman, once armed and on the field, is equally well-equipped for every place, time, or appearance of the enemy. He is, moreover, quite ready and needs to make no change, whether he is required to fight in the main body, or in a detachment, or in a single maniple, or even by himself. Therefore, as the individual members of the Roman force are so much more serviceable, their plans are also much more often attended by success than those of others.”

Of course these conceptions are theoretical and represent methods of defeating the phalanx as a formation. The real life experiences of the Romans had more to do with tactics and the quality of the commanders than the phalanx formation itself. In my next post we will review some cases of the maniple against the phalanx to see whether the virtues of the Roman formation cited by Polybius were seen in real life.

The Teutoburg Massacre – End Game

As mentioned in a previous post, Augustus was beside himself when told of the loss of three legions at Teutoburg and screamed “Quinctilius Varus, bring back my eagles!” Augustus was forever spooked by the massacre and commanded that his army retreat to the banks of the Rhine, avoiding all future designs on the German territory. He did not live to see the recovered eagles of the lost legions or get the revenge he must have wanted against Arminius. At the time of his death in 14 A.D, no plans had been made for dealing with the Germans.

Tiberius, however, once he was named Caesar, wasted no time moving north to control the German tribes and gain revenge against Arminius. Even though Augustus’ death occurred as late as August 19^th, an army under Tiberius’ nephew Germanicus was ordered to attack the Germans before year end.

The map below shows Germanicus’ campaigns of 14-16 A.D.

In 14 A.D. Germanicus ambushed the Marci and inflicted heavy losses. During its withdrawal to the Rhine, his army was attacked by the aroused Bructeri, Tubonti, and Usipedi tribes, but the  Romans were able to escape after significant losses.

In 15 A.D. there were two major campaigns. In the spring Legatus Caecina Severus attacked the Marsi a second time while Germanicus was defeating the Chatti. These attacks were preemptive and designed to suppress allies of the Cherusci so the latter could be attacked with less risk. In the second half of 15 Germanicus divided the Roman army into three parts, positioning them for simultaneous attacks. Severus attacked the Bructeri while Albinovanus attacked the Frisi. Separately, Germanicus came by sea and met up with them at the Amisia River. The combined armies fought their way to the head of the river which was near the site of the Teutoburg massacre.

Germanicus erected a mound over the burial site containing the bones of the Roman soldiers and conducted funeral rites to honor the dead. On their way back to the Rhine, the Romans were ambushed again by Arminius, but this time Severus and Germanicus were able to fight their way out of the trap. Germanicus had additional difficulty with his withdrawal by sea when his ships could not be fully loaded because of shallow water. Part of his army had to march along the shoreline and many soldiers were swept away and drowned by the tides.

During the campaigns of 15, Germanicus was able to retrieve two of the eagles lost in the Teutoburg battle (the third was not recovered until 41 A.D.).

The year 16 A.D. brought an end to the Roman campaigns against the Germans. The main event that year involved Germanicus pushing across the Weser and defeating Arminius at Idistaviso. Recalled after the German campaign was complete, Germanicus received a triumph in May of 17 A.D.

There is much debate about the Roman position vis a vis the Germans after the Teutoburg massacre. Many have taken the position that the loss of the three legions blocked forever Roman attempts to conquer Germany influencing the course of European development for the future. I think that point is debatable for at least two reasons. First, Tiberius ended the German campaigns because he felt the effort was not worth the losses incurred, not because of the massacre. He decided that the plan of letting the German tribes fight among themselves was a better strategy. Second, he had better uses of the army than post them in barbarian Germany.

The fact that Rome never conquered Germany was more about the difficulty of accomplishing that goal given the strength and relationship between the German tribes than anything else. Rome would eventually reach Britain during the time of Claudius, but would never move east of Gaul after 16 A.D.

Teutoburg – The Prequel

It’s instructive to take a look that the events leading up to the Teutoburg debacle as a part of the bigger picture of Rome and the German tribes. Ultimately, we’ll get to the question of the impact of Teutoburg on Roman strategy and the longer term effects on Europe, but any conclusions drawn from our review depend on placing the event in the proper context.

Caesar took Gaul in the 50s B.C. and fought with the Germans at various times when they crossed the Rhine. The Germans were tough, tougher than the Gauls, and many tribes refused to be ruled. Other tribes saw the benefit of a Roman alliance and were content to operate under treaties.

At the beginning of Augustus’ reign, Gaul consisted of Cisalpine Gaul, Narbonese Gaul (also called Transalpine Gaul), and the three parts resulting from conquests by Caesar -- Aquitaine, Lugdunensis (central Gaul) and Belgica. Geographically speaking Cisalpine Gaul refers to Gaul “on this side of the Alps” while Transalpine Gaul was Gaul “on the other side of the Alps”.

The map I created below shows the relevant activities of this period.

Augustus made the decision circa 20 B.C. to protect Cisapline Gaul by securing the Alps. There had been continuing harassment of Roman couriers by Alpine tribes and communications with the north had become an ongoing concern. To solve this problem, Augustus developed a plan to push the border northward to the Danube and establish the new border on a line from Lake Constance to Vienna. After Nerva had cleared the valleys between the Italian lakes in 16-17 B.C, the way was clear for the advance to the Danube to begin. Augustus gave his two stepsons, Tiberius and Drusus, the responsibility for the taking the new territory. Tiberius was to attack in the area near Lake Constance and Drusus work his way north through the Brenner pass. Their work was complete by the end of 15 B.C. and their accomplishments celebrated by Horace.

For, with your army, brave Drusus, demolished

the Genauni, that implacable race, in more

direct retaliation, the swift

Breuni, and their defenses, established

on the formidable Alpine heights: and soon

Tiberius, the elder Nero, entered

that fierce fight, with his favorable

omens, defeating the wild Rhaetians:

it was wonderful to see with what destruction,

in contesting the war, he exhausted those minds

intent on the deaths of our freemen,

as the south wind, almost, when it troubles

Circa 12 B.C. Augustus made a further decision to move the western German border from the Rhine to the Elbe. He was uncomfortable with the gap in the Black Forest that separated the sources of the Rhine and Danube and realized that moving the western border to the east, he could eliminate that gap. The eastern advance was entrusted to Drusus who began his campaign in 11 B.C. By the end of the year he was successful in working his way to the Weser River.

In 9 B.C. Drusus moved all the way to the Elbe before his unfortunate death in a riding accident.

Tiberius was then given proconsular control of Germania and worked at reducing it until 7 B.C. In 4 B.C. he returned to Germania, reconnoitered Jutland, and advanced to the Elbe in the north.  Now with the Elbe established as the border in Germania it remained to defeat the Marcomanni in Bohemia to cement the Elbe Danube connection.

But it was not to be. In the midst of the war with the Marcomanni, Tiberius was forced to treat with them and break off to put down a revolt in Pannonia (present day Hungary).  The revolt was put down in 6 A.D. with the help of young Germanicus.

Now Tiberius had a couple of years to catch his breath before the Teutoburg disaster.

Massacre at the Teutoburg Forest

Rome’s greatest defeat came in the Battle of Teutoburg Forest, which I would rather label the Massacre or Ambush at Teutoburg Forest. To me, a battle results from a conscious decision on the part of two commanders to engage one another. There was no decision like that in this case because the Romans were not in a position to defend themselves.

The attack took place in 9 A.D. against the legions XVII, XVIII, and XIX of Sextus Quinctilius Varus who had been commander of Germania since 7 A.D. Normally stationed near the Weser River, Varus heard of revolts around the Rhine so he traveled west to investigate.  All three legions were wiped out, and when the seventy-two year Caesar Augustus was told of the debacle, he screamed for Varus to return his eagles.

Part of the intrigue of the story centers around Arminius, son of the leader of the German tribe Cherusci, who was given to the Romans as a hostage in 11 B.C. He was raised in Rome, eventually being elevated to a Knight. Arminius (in Germany he's called Hermann) was assigned to the legions of Varus as a trusted advisor, but in secret he plotted with the German tribes to attack the Roman legions.

Before we get to the massacre, we’ll need to talk about the Geography. The following satellite view positions the Teutoburg forest in Northern Germany.

It sits 130 miles east of Amsterdam, 70 miles west of Hannover, and 130 miles northeast of Cologne.

View 2 below shows a close up of the main area of conflict.

Key reference points include the cities of Engter and Venne, along with Kalkriese Hill, which was directly involved in the action. The majority of excavated Roman remains from the battle were found in the boxed area shown.

View 3 is a closeup of the area north of Kalkriese Hill.

As noted in the photo, there are modern towers which allow visitors to survey the battlefield and there is one spot marked as the site of the ambush. There is also a museum there. One of the important things to notice in this view is the relationship between Kalkriese Hill and the Great Bog. The Roman Army became trapped in the narrow corridor (estimated at 200 yards wide) between the hill and the bog. This proved to be a tactical advantage for the Germans. To make the trap complete, they dug a trench in the road so the Roman Army was blocked from three sides.

Lastly, we have view 4 which depicts the movements of the Roman Army during the battle.

I want to emphasize that my description of the course of the battle is based on the documents I reviewed and is, by necessity, conjectural. The antiquarian writers, most notably Dio, cannot be trusted. Descriptive data is sparse and the writers have agendas so one does not know where the truth lies. Lack of details does not change the major facts of the battle or its significance, however.

The battle opened with the Roman Army marching west into the Teutoburg Forest. Descriptions have the Roman force stretched out as much as nine miles in a narrow column. This seems logical since axe men would have been cutting down trees and the resulting roadway would have been narrow. When the army reached a point northeast of Osnabruck they were ambushed. Dio says that Arminius asked to be excused to check on auxiliaries but instead met up with the Germans to set up the attack.

The Romans were ambushed at 1, in the midst of a heavy rainstorm, and lost scores of men because they could not deploy adequately against the German archers. By the end of the first day, they had regained their footing and built a fortified camp where they spent the first night. Assailed again in the morning they were able to break out to the southeast and reached 2, a point north of the Wiehen Hills and northwest of Ostercappeln. It’s unclear whether they spent the night there, but that is a possibility. The next day the army resumed its trek to the northwest, still in heavy rain, arriving at 3, an area north of the Kalkriese Hill, where the final massacre took place. Trapped in the narrow corridor between the Kalkriese Hill and the Great Bog, the rest of the army was destroyed.

Three legions were wiped out with an equivalent number of auxiliaries totaling some 20,000. Most of the Roman commanders including Varus committed suicide once they realized there was no escape.

From a tactical standpoint there is no way the Roman Army could have survived this “perfect storm” of tactical obstacles. To reiterate.

1) ambushed in unfamiliar territory

2) unable to efficiently form into battle because of the disposition of the caravan

3) trapped in wooded terrain

4) double crossed by allies who could communicate vital intelligence to the enemy.

5) driving rainstorm during the entire assault

Would Caesar have survived this?

Varus was criticized as being more of a politician than a military leader but he must have had many good men under him. At the time of his death, he would have been the forth ranked man in Rome after Augustus, Tiberius, and Germanicus.

Footnotes -- The legion numbers 17-19 were never used again by the Roman Army because of the ill luck and disgrace of Varus' men. Two of the eagles were recovered in 15-16 A.D, while the third was not retrieved until 42 A.D.

Fall of the Roman Republic – Anatomy of a Collapse

Everyone seems to write about the fall of the Roman Empire – Gibbon et al. I guess they look at the end of the Empire as the seminal event because it marks the end of a thousand years of Roman power and the onset of the Dark Ages. I, however, would rather study the fall of the Roman Republic because it is much more interesting. First of all the Republic is a classic governmental form like the democracies of Greece. The Empire, by contrast, was a corrupt totalitarian system which was bound to collapse at some point under its own weight.

Secondly, the Republic was a political incubator, unique in its time. When the Romans threw out the Etruscan kings they made a conscious decision to create a representational government. In the beginning the Patrician class had too much power and the Plebian class had none. Then, over time, the classes came into better balance with the rise of the middle class and its increased political influence. Finally, after three hundred and fifty years, the Republic began to develop problems that would snowball into its collapse.

Thirdly, it’s interesting to look at the reasons why the Republic fell. What does this tell us about the evolution of political systems? Are they all bound to fail at some point or can the path toward collapse be reversed. Lastly, is there something we can learn about the Roman republic that is applicable to our contemporary world?

When The Third Punic War ended in 146 B.C. Carthage was eliminated as a rival to Rome, and the Mediterranean Sea  became Mare Nostrum.  By then Greece  was a client state, the Germans were behaving, and except for some problems in Spain the provinces seemed stable. All was not well at home, however,  because class problems were about to serve as the spark which would burn down the Republic.

In the paragraphs following I will lay out a chronology  showing how the collapse of the Republic became the inevitable outcome of a series of events which undermined the old system and created opportunities for those who wanted power for themselves.

__________________________________________

1. The incessant wars of the second century had profound impact on the small landowner. Many died in battle or returned from war to find themselves destitute because their land was not worked while they were away. The wealthy accumulated forfeited land and began to work it for themselves often employing slaves instead of Roman citizens. The huge estates resulting from this accumulation further concentrated wealth in the hands of the few. Displaced farmers gravitated to the city hoping to find work but were largely unsuccessful.

Impact: A permanent underclass of was created upsetting the balance between Patricians, Knights, and Plebians.

2. The destruction of the peasant farmer caused hardship for the army because there were not enough landowners left to meet its requirements.

Impact: A shortage of recruits at a time when Rome was expanding.

3. During the period 133-122 B.C. the brothers Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus sought to alleviate the problems described above by passing land distribution bills. These bills would have created farms for the unemployed and veterans, slowing down the drift to poverty and increasing the number of recruits. The brothers were indifferent to the risk of taking on the wealthy because they wanted to solve the social problems of the Republic. Both were murdered by supporters of rich senators who did not want to see their assets re-allocated to the lower classes.

Impact: By murdering tribunes of the people the Senate showed an inclination to circumvent the law when necessary even to the point of having legitimately elected officials murdered. They also showed themselves to be against the people and unable to govern a society where the powers were balanced.

4. Political factions developed. Optimates representing conservatives supported the Senate’s desire for status quo and they were opposed by the Populares who supported change.

Impact: The interests of the people as expressed through the assembly were now determined to overcome the will of the Senate.

5. In 110 B.C. Rome began a war with Numidia and its charismatic leader Jugurtha. After a series of failed attempts to defeat the enemy, and the replacement of several commanding generals, the Plebian general Marius was chosen as the commander by the assembly against the wishes of the Senate.

Impact: The people’s assembly used its power to manage foreign policy, an invasion the rights previously held exclusively by the Senate.

6. Marius suspended the property qualification for military service in 107 B.C. This solved the problem of recruiting but opens up a much more ominous precedent – loyalty of the army.

Impact: The loyalty of the Roman army was now transferred from the Senate and the people to the commanding general. The army now looked to Marius to give them property after the war.

So now we were forty years into the collapse of the Republic and it’s obvious that a reversal is not possible. The people (or mob as some might say) have taken power from the Senate which had lost its moral authority. The army now belonged to the commanding general instead of the government. Respect for the old institutions is gone forever because they were not able to solve the socio-economic problems of the Roman people.

7. Marius, never the politician, resorted to political types to act as his agents. One tribune, named Saturninus, strong-armed the Senate into allocating land for Marius’ veterans by threatening Senators with exile. Marius later tired of Saturninus using gangs to influence policy, marched an improvised army into Rome, and killed Saturninus and his followers.

Impact: A new precedent was set for the army attacking Rome and killing its political opponents.

8. King Mithridates of Pontus raised an army in 88 B.C. and attacked Athens forcing Rome to respond. Command for the Greek army of invasion was entrusted to Lucius Cornelius Sulla, a Patrician who had distinguished himself previously during the Jurguthine War. Blocking Sulla, a tribune named Sulpicius Rufus had Marius named commander instead. Sulla, unwilling to put up with this rebuke, marched his army on Rome and took the city.

Impact: The Roman Army and its commanders now understood that they could take power whenever they wanted. All that remained was for the last vestiges of honor and respect for the Roman political system to pass away. But not quite yet!

9. Sulla defeated Mithridates, returned to Rome, and declared himself dictator – a move he claimed was necessary to save the Republic. He passed many new laws – some good, some bad – but in all cases followed the proper form and passed them through the assembly. In 80 B.C. Sulla abdicated his position as dictator and was elected consul. Following the consulship, he retired.

Impact: A commander, in control of the army, made himself dictator and tried to use legislation to save the Republic. Most of these laws were rescinded once he left the scene proving that political momentum cannot be reversed. Surprisingly, Sulla went to the brink of creating an empire but then pulled back.

10. In the period following Sulla (80-60 B.C.), Pompey, Crassus, and Caesar rose to power. Although each had different abilities and objectives, they become aligned when each was snubbed by a Senate that was trying to regain its power. They split the provinces between themselves accumulating power and wealth along the way.

Impact: Rome was now controlled by a triumvirate of military commanders who ruled jointly without restraint.

11. In 60 B.C, Caesar decided that he needed greater military success on his resume so he had Gaul assigned to him as a province and went to war there for ten years. Crassus was killed in battle in 52 B.C. and that coupled with the death of Pompey’s wife (Caesar’s daughter) broke up the alliance. With the Gallic victory complete, Caesar marched on Rome, crossing the Rubicon River in 49 B.C.

Impact: Now for the first time the stars were completely aligned for Empire building. We had a man who wanted wealth and power without a care for tradition. He controlled an army, which gave him the means to control Rome.

As we look at the fall of the Republic, we see in the beginning a power vacuum created when the Senate failed what the people perceived was its responsibility. These failures would have been masked previously through their own control mechanisms such as patronage, but those controls were now largely eroded by the growth of the middle class (Knights) who wanted some of that power and the displaced landowners who were now urban poor.

The people, through their advocates, resisted the Senate until the watershed event of Marius’ elimination of the property qualification. That event turned the army into a force engine for any commander who wanted control of Rome. Back and forth the struggle went until the stars were aligned for Caesar. Ironic that Caesar would be assassinated by a group of Republicans trying to hang on to the old system. They were too late.