One of my readers posed the following question. “How
were the Romans able to get past the long spears of a Greek phalanx, when they
were only armed with a gladius? Flanking maneuvers?”
For the answer,
let us turn to Polybius, the Greek historian, who spent much of his life in
Rome. His dates were ~ 200-118 B.C, so his observations and writings describe
conditions during the third Punic War.
In his sixth book of Histories,
Polybius endeavored to explain why the Romans were able to defeat the phalanx.
I quote him directly.
“Why
is it then that the Romans conquer? And what is it that brings disaster on
those who employ the phalanx? Why, just because war is full of uncertainties
both as to time and place; whereas there is but one time and one kind of ground
in which a phalanx can fully work. If, then, there were anything to compel the
enemy to accommodate himself to the time and place of the phalanx, when about
to fight a general engagement, it would be but natural to expect that those who
employed the phalanx would always carry off the victory.
But if the enemy finds it
possible, and even easy, to avoid its attack, what becomes of its formidable
character? Again, no one denies that for its employment it is indispensable to
have a country flat, bare, and without such impediments as ditches, cavities,
depressions, steep banks, or beds of rivers: for all such obstacles are
sufficient to hinder and dislocate this particular formation.
And
that it is, I may say, impossible, or at any rate exceedingly rare to find a
piece of country of twenty strades, or sometimes of even greater extent, without
any such obstacles, everyone will also admit.
However, let us suppose that
such a district has been found. If the enemy decline to come down into it, but
traverse the country sacking the towns and territories of the allies, what use
will the phalanx be? For if it remains on the ground suited to itself, it will
not only fail to benefit its friends, but will be incapable even of preserving
itself; for the carriage of provisions will be easily stopped by the enemy,
seeing that they are in undisputed possession of the country: while if it quits
its proper ground, from the wish to strike a blow, it will be an easy prey to
the enemy.
Nay, if a general does descend into the plain, and yet does not risk his whole
army upon one charge of the phalanx or upon one chance, but maneuvers for a
time to avoid coming to close quarters in the engagement, it is easy to learn
what will be the result from what the Romans are now actually doing.
The Romans do
not, then, attempt to extend their front to equal that of a phalanx, and then
charge directly upon it with their whole force: but some of their divisions are
kept in reserve, while others join battle with the enemy at close quarters.
Now, whether the phalanx in its charge drives its opponents from their ground,
or is itself driven back, in either case its peculiar order is dislocated; for
whether in following the retiring, or flying from the advancing enemy, they
quit the rest of their forces: and when this takes place, the enemy's reserves
can occupy the space thus left, and the ground which the phalanx had just
before been holding, and so no longer charge them face to face, but fall upon
them on their flank and rear.
If,
then, it is easy to take precautions against the opportunities and peculiar
advantages of the phalanx, but impossible to do so in the case of its
disadvantages, must it not follow that in practice the difference between these
two systems is enormous? Of course, those generals who employ the phalanx must
march over ground of every description, must pitch camps, occupy points of
advantage, besiege, and be besieged, and meet with unexpected appearances of
the enemy: for all these are part and parcel of war, and have an important and
sometimes decisive influence on the ultimate victory. And in all these cases
the Macedonian phalanx is difficult, and sometimes impossible, to handle,
because the men cannot act either in squads or separately.
The Roman order on the other
hand is flexible: for every Roman, once armed and on the field, is equally
well-equipped for every place, time, or appearance of the enemy. He is,
moreover, quite ready and needs to make no change, whether he is required to
fight in the main body, or in a detachment, or in a single maniple, or even by
himself. Therefore, as the individual members of the Roman force are so much more
serviceable, their plans are also much more often attended by success than
those of others.”
Of
course these conceptions are theoretical and represent methods of defeating the
phalanx as a formation. The real life experiences of the Romans had more to do
with tactics and the quality of the commanders than the phalanx formation itself.
In my next post we will review some cases of the maniple against the phalanx to
see whether the virtues of the Roman formation cited by Polybius were seen in
real life.